develop the basic theory underlying capitalist variety, building primarily on the "Varieties of Capitalism" (VoC) view developed by Hall and Soskice (2001) and the debate that followed.
Sections 3, 4 and 5, in turn, examine exogenous shocks to the different political-economic systems in Europe -the Single European Market, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Enlargement -and assess their impact on diversity.
'Varieties of Capitalism' -The Basics
The VoC approach identifies capitalist production regimes, relatively coherent institutional arrangements within which firms pursue their goals of making profit. It starts therefore axiomatically with the firm in the centre of the analysis, treating it as a relational network: the firm, operating in its markets and other aspects of the relevant environment, is institutionally embedded.
These institutional frameworks, in turn, are mutually attuned in systemic ways, leading to institutional complementarities, and confer comparative and competitive advantages to countries, which are reinforced through specialisation in rapidly integrating international markets. What emerges, in ideal-typical form, are two (or more, but at least two) institutional equilibria, one where coordination takes the form of contractual relations (liberal market economies -LMEs henceforth) and another which relies on strategic forms of coordination (coordinated market economies or CMEs).
By placing the firm at the center of the analysis, VoC explores capitalism from the vantage point of what it considers as its central actor -business. Where other perspectives have focused on descriptive macro-level attributes, and to a large extent have read the shape of markets and the nature of market participants as a function of those macro-structures, VoC instead starts with the analytics underlying the coordination problems that firms face in their strategic environment. A capitalist economy, according to VoC, is riddled with information and hold-up problems: how do owners know that managers maximize profits, managers that workers perform to the level of their abilities, and workers that managers will not fire them after they have put in their effort?
The solution to these potentially debilitating information asymmetries is offered by the historically given institutional frameworks within which management finds itself. Firms are permanently exposed to changing markets -product markets which structure relations between firms and their customers; labour markets where workers and management meet; and capital markets which provide firms with capital -and the governance of these markets takes very different shapes in different capitalist economies. Labour markets in Germany, Sweden and other countries in North-Western Europe, for example, are highly structured arrangements, where strong employers associations meet strong trade unions and collectively negotiate wages. Capital provision has, up until very recently, been organized through banks in those countries, and even if international investors have made a dramatic and massive appearance on these capital markets over the last decade, the relations between firms and banks remain highly coordinated. Compare this with the dispersed shareholder systems associated with the City of London and Wall Street, or with the loose hire and fire labour market regulations in most Anglo-Saxon (but very few continental European) economies, and the differences are clear. Firms in these two types of systems do not operate in the same labour and capital markets. This is not a coincidence: it makes little sense to link long-term capital provision along the lines of what banks usually provide to short-term, deregulated labour markets or vice versa. Longterm investors are usually very willing to invest in the provision of specific skills for workers and accept that regulated labour markets are a useful way of doing so. Nervous institutional investors such as mutual funds, on the other hand, are loathe to sink capital in to a long-term training project with uncertain (and often even longer-term) pay-offs and that ties their capital to the effort and skills of workers. The crucial issue is that once labour and product markets are linked in such systemic ways, the options for a company in terms of product markets are considerably narrower as well. Building machine tools in a competitive way, for example, requires that both employer and employee invest in skills that further a deep knowledge of the technology deployed and of the type of customers that would want to buy such complex capital goods. Specific skills and long-term capital are combined, in other words, in ways that produce important competitive advantages in relatively narrow market niches, where long-term, relationship-specific links between producers and consumers emerge.
VoC systematizes this insight into a key argument: the presence of several "correctly calibrated" institutions that govern different markets determines the efficiency of the overall institutional framework. This argument for the existence of "institutional complementarities" implies that for a framework to have the desired strong effect, the constituent institutions in the different markets -between labour relations and corporate governance, labour relations and the national training system, and corporate governance and inter-firm relations -reinforce each other.
The tightness of the links between these institutional complementarities linking institutional subsystems determines the degree to which a political economy is, or is not, "co-ordinated". Coordinated market economies (CMEs) are characterized by the prevalence of non-market relations, collaboration, and credible commitments among of firms.
The essence of its "liberal market economy" (LME) counterpart is one of arms-length, competitive relations, formal contracting, and supply-and-demand price signalling (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2004) . VoC argues that these institutional complementarities lead to different kinds of firm behaviour and investment patterns. In LMEs, fluid labour markets fit well with easy access to stock market capital, producing "radical-innovator" firms in sectors ranging from bio-technology, semi-conductors, software and advertising to corporate finance. In CMEs, long-term employment strategies, rule-bound behaviour and the durable ties between firms and banks that underpin patient capital provision predispose firms to "incremental innovation" in capital goods industries, machine tools and equipment of all kinds. While the logic of LME dynamics is centred on mobile assets whose value can be realized when diverted to multiple purposes, CME logic derives from specific or co-specific assets whose value depends on the active co-operation of others (Hall and Soskice 2001; Hall and Gingerich 2004) .
The persistence of capitalist diversity is largely attributed to the "positive feedbacks" referred to above: the different logics of LMEs and CMEs create different incentives for economic actors, which, in turn, generate different politics of economic adjustment. " [I] n the face of an exogenous shock threatening returns to existing activities, holders of mobile assets will be tempted to "exit" those activities to seek higher returns elsewhere, while holders of specific assets have higher incentives to exercize "voice" in defence of existing activities" (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 32) . In LMEs, holders of mobile assets (workers with general skills, investors in fluid capital markets) will seek to make markets still more fluid and accept further deregulatory policies. In CMEs, holders of specific assets (workers with industry-specific skills and investors in co-specific assets) will more often oppose greater market competition and form status-quo supporting crossclass coalitions (Hall and Gingerich 2004: 28-29) . Globalization thus reinforces this logic of divergent adjustment instead of undermining it (Hall and Soskice 2001; Gourevitch and Hawes 2002) . Since FDI will flow to locations rich in either specific or co-specific assets, depending on the sector or firm-specific requirements that investors are searching for, globalization will often reinforce comparative institutional advantage. CMEs and LMEs are therefore likely to be located at different points in international production chains: high value-added, high skill-dependent, highproductivity activities will tend to remain in the core CMEs, while lower value-added, lower-skill, price-oriented production will relocate to lower-cost jurisdictions.
The final step in the argument therefore links the development of these coherent institutional frameworks to the processes of economic integration associated with globalization and European integration. It builds on two key insights in classical political economy. Ricardo"s theory of comparative advantage suggests that if two trading nations specialize in what they do relatively better, the overall outcome will be beneficial. VoC suggests that in today"s world the intricate institutional frameworks in different capitalist economies also confer such comparative advantages.
Adam Smith"s idea that the division of labour is determined by the extent of the market -the larger the market, the more market participants specialize -is the second. Ergo: since economic integration increases the size of the market, nations will specialize according to their comparative advantages.
Varieties of capitalism in Europe
Before exploring the empirical material on adjustment in Europe, two important methodological questions need to be addressed: one, how does change occur in such systems?; and two, how well does the LME-CME distinction in VoC capture the empirical reality, especially within Europe, of countries such as France, Italy, or Spain with their large state-owned sectors or the new arrivals on the capitalist scene in Central Europe? The issue of change goes to the heart of the VoC argument, which says that the tight linkages between the different elements in an institutional framework militate against more than incremental changes in the overall production regime. Imagine that one element in the framework, for example labour markets in CMEs, comes under pressure. The VoC argument suggests that the articulation of the labour market with, for example, product market strategies precludes dramatic shifts in the labour market. If companies in CMEs aim to retain their comparative advantage in industries that are built on highly-skilled workers, attempts at radical deregulation of the labour market are likely to undermine those business strategies and important sections of business will mobilize against deregulation (Wood 2001) . The issues of empirical accuracy speaks to the question of how to include elements of a political-economic framework which are neither pure market nor business association-based, a situation we find in many continental European economies.
Since the second oil shock around 1980, change has been a central element of all European political economies: European integration and international competition, the almost simultaneous construction of EMU and the inclusion of the former Soviet-bloc states in Central Europe, and many macro-economic crises and adjustments since the 1980s have all put pressure on the stable models that VoC has identified. Most proponents of that approach, however, would argue that despite these pressures, and despite the many political initiatives to adjust to these new challenges, the basic logic underlying the model -which claims that production regimes are relatively stable institutional arrangements -reinforces rather than subverts these different institutional arrangements. Hall (2007) , for example, analyses capitalist variety in Europe since the second world war to demonstrate how changes were translated into policies that were compatible with the existing framework. Despite the destruction that Germany faced in 1945, for example, labour markets could relatively easily be reconstructed by combining training systems, workplace-level co-decision schemes and industry-level collective bargaining (Hall 2007: 46-7) . And in France the responses to the crises of the 1970s and 1980s entailed a wholesale abandonment of previous attempts at decentralized decision-making and a return to the labour-exclusionary model that had characterized the post-war era (Hall 2007: 54-6) . Expanding this key neo-institutionalist point, Hall and Thelen (2009) argue that institutional change need not undermine the capacity of companies to coordinate.
Others, however, are more critical of this argument. In their introduction to a wide-ranging collection of essays on political-economic adjustment, Streeck and Thelen (2005) suggest a very different reading of the last two decades of adjustment. According to them, significant changes in function may be disguised as continuity in form and thus pass unnoticed, while impoverished notions of change prevent us from understanding subtle shifts. Their core claim is that institutional frameworks never entirely disappear, are reorganized wholesale, or are invented anew; instead, new elements are introduced into existing frameworks without each one of them necessarily undermining them. But, as more of these novel elements accumulate, the logic of the initial set-up and its effects may change dramatically in nature. The upshot for the debate on comparative capitalism is that national models are probably not sufficiently stable over the long term for such typologies to capture them accurately, a critique echoing Crouch"s (2005) point that the focus on national models reduces often substantial internal variation to statistical noise. The German model, as Streeck (2009) argues in a recent book, is no longer the highly coordinated social market economy that figures so prominently in VoC, but has been transformed because of many small changes in the operation of the underlying institutional framework.
The second question addresses the nature of the LME/CME typology that VoC proposes. To what extent can a framework that is built on the juxtaposition of strategic, associational and atomistic market governance make sense of economies that appear to rely heavily on ownership and regulation by the state? In addition, how do the new market economies fit in this whole picture?
Even if we accept that economic actors adjust their behaviour according to the institutional framework they are embedded in, these frameworks were built through trial and error, conflict, and institutional imposition over periods that ranged from several decades to several centuries; two decades (since the fall of the Berlin Wall) may simply not be long enough for such processes to play themselves out. In addition, the Copenhagen accession criteria made sure that a large part of the political-economic choices in Central Europe were conditioned by the views of the EU and its existing member-states in 1994. Since the new member-states in Central Europe are the subject of a section on their own below, I refer to that section and especially the conclusion of this chapter which will follow the presentation of all the relevant material.
The Mediterranean economies, on the other hand, pose a direct problem for VoC, precisely because they have on the whole been democratic-capitalist economies since at least the second world war -in other words, as long as Germany, Sweden or Ireland. One of the ways to make sense of the differences between the Mediterranean Mixed Market Economies (MME) and CME or LME is to start from the different role of the state in those economies. As Molina and Rhodes (2007) point out, MMEs can perhaps best be understood in a two-tiered framework, in which firms attempt to coordinate the production of collective goods among themselves, but are forced to rely on the state to compensate for gaps in the institutional framework which preclude them to deliver those autonomously. In MMEs, in other words, the state is an integral part of the variety of capitalism, because it oils the machine at moments when institutional deficiencies would make it become stuck.
Building on this insight which follows from an analysis of Italy and Spain, Hancké et al. (2007) in fact reinterpret the VoC typology by bringing in both state and labour in addition to the organization of capital. This slightly wider perspective is useful, since it makes clear that the CME-LME distinction led to the assumption that the state was not a crucial actor in the original framework: in both types of capitalism, relations between the state and the rest of the economy are more arms" length today, often involving broad framework arrangements instead of ownership or micromanagement through detailed regulation. France, Italy and Spain each have, in different ways, a state that has played and often still plays a central role in the economy, despite decades of liberalization and privatization.
These different capitalist models -coordinated, liberal and mixed market economies -have faced a series of important shocks over the last two decades. The completion of the Single Market Programme, EMU, and eastern enlargement all introduced new pressures on what once looked like relatively stable political-economic arrangements. How are we to understand these changes, both in terms of their causes and their effects? And when, where and how would such shifts in the political economy of Europe influence the viability of existing capitalist models? Perhaps the most interesting conceptual point of entry into these questions is offered by the notion of institutional complementarities. Since different elements in an institutional framework are tightly linked to one another, changes in one -say, in the sphere of firm ownership, corporate governance and financeare likely to have important consequences for the organization of other spheres in the economy, for example the labour market. The reason is that at the level of firms, the incentive structure of the average manager would shift, for example from a longer-term to a short-term profit orientation, which might entail a change in wage-setting and training strategies. Aggregated over an entire economy, this would lead to a parallel but more gradual shift as firms adjust to new ownership arrangements. However, the actual mechanism through which such a translation of pressures from one sphere to another would happen is unclear and probably underdetermined: does the tight linkage imply that shifts are directly and rapidly transmitted or, on the contrary, that the pressures for change are neutralized since all institutional elements would have to change at the same time? In addition, how do we think about the effects of such pressures?
The Single European Market
The Single European Market is an excellent place to start such an inquiry. If product, labour and capital markets in different countries have been following different logics as a result of their national embeddedness, then the increased freedom of movement of capital, people, goods and services across the EU offers an opportunity to test the causes and effects of economic integration.
The first observation is that increased trade and more broadly increased flows of capital and people have, on the whole, not affected the organization of individual European economies much:
Germany, Italy, France and the UK have been exposed to trade since the mid-1970s, and developed very different but complementary export profiles, while small economies always knew how to use domestic institutions as instruments for maneuvering hard economic times (Katzenstein 1985) .
However, entirely new pressures emerged from financial market integration via ownership on corporate governance, and in turn on labour market institutions along the logic outlined earlier.
These direct effects have also been limited, however, especially in the large multinational firms.
Even large German firms, which have come under pressure from new shareholders, have avoided massive labour market deregulation (Wood 2001) and instead have stuck to the existing wagesetting and training systems while negotiating adjustments in the margins (Hassel 2007) . In other words, the articulation of ownership arrangements with labour market institutions, in which shifts in finance trigger adjustments in the labour market, is considerably looser than many had thought.
Sometimes the relationship between finance and labour markets moves in unpredictable ways: explaining why hedge funds and mutual funds flock disproportionately to France and not Germany, Goyer (2007) notes that such funds demand unilateral management action without significant accountability to labour -something they can easily find in France, but not in Germany.
If the single market seems to have had few significant direct effects through trade or foreign investment, possibly the emergence of a pan-European regulatory framework in such network industries as transport, telecommunications, and energy, often explicitly drafted to counteract "protectionist" national regulations, would? Since market-making through regulation is what characterizes the EU more than anything else, effects of integration would be found here. A detailed analysis of regulation in different network utility industries in the UK, France and Germany (Thatcher 2007) suggests the situation is highly complex: EU regulation in these industries has forced change in the national systems, but much of the change has followed implementation patterns that suggest a profound procedural continuity with the old national models. The process of liberalizing and sometimes privatizing these public and semi-public utilities reflects the general state-economy links which had been in existence. EU-wide market-oriented liberalization often ratified existing practices in the UK, and their net effect was therefore negligible. In France the government relied on EU regulation to "internationalize" the national champions, large firms such as Electricité de France and France Télécom, by supporting them in their strategy of expansion into other markets while slowing down transposition of EU rules into domestic law. And in Germany, the prevailing close links between different companies in these industries offered the institutional matrix for adjustment, which was largely governed through the industry associations (Thatcher 2007: 167-169) .
Drawing a picture of Western European capitalism that emphasizes persistent stability would be incomplete and wrong, however. It sidesteps many complex domestic changes, especially in the areas of welfare states and labour markets, where significant reorganizations often followed fiscal problems, persistent unemployment, and more generally a post-Keynesian view of the welfare state that favours employability over employment stability and income maintenance. Broadly speaking, welfare arrangements everywhere have become more "incentive compatible", reflecting the shift from a passive support of weak income groups to an active shaping of employment chances. Sometimes, as in the case of employment policies and pension funding, many of the European nation-states have looked across the border, helped through the information exchanges taking place under the aegis of the Open Method of Coordination. Pension arrangements across Europe, for example, look more alike today than they ever did in the past, and some form of active labour market policy, which combines income support with retraining, is now standard in many European countries. But the previous existing institutional make-up shines through, even in these more activist welfare policies: where labour unions and employers were important in organizing the labour market and setting wages, they still play a central role;and where they were absent, as in the UK, or have played a marginal role, as in France, that still remains the case). Sectoral pension funds, for example, are run by the social partners in countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Sweden, but are primarily private affairs, without labour union involvement, in the UK.
Convergence in these areas of the labour market and the welfare state, while important, can therefore also be understood along the lines of the logics that preceded these new initiatives.
The fact that almost twenty years after the completion of the Single Market programme, institutional convergence across the European economies remains limited, should not really come as a surprise. Since the Single Market"s aim was to increase trade, it effectively raised the scale of the relevant market for each of the different production regimes underlying capitalist diversity in Europe. French, German, Italian and British companies therefore developed their comparative advantages, which were largely built on the very different institutional frameworks in these countries. If specialization is a function of the size of the market, then a larger and growing market is bound to produce more not less differentiation. At the same time, the causes and especially the consequences of shifts in the European political economies are not always easy to examine. Europe is going through a phase of rapid change -and this was true even before the financial and economic crisis of 2008 -and key VoC insights, such as complementarities, comparative institutional advantage and the institutional embeddedness of production regimes, help us understand what has been going on in Western Europe since the mid-1980s. How then do these same ideas help us make sense of the main changes in the 2000s -EMU and enlargement?
Varieties of European capitalism in EMU
Institutional complementarities played an important role in the way EU member-states have handled the dramatic shift in the European macro-economic policy-making following the introduction of the Euro in 1999. EMU created a remarkable situation in the political economy of Europe, and especially of those member-states that joined EMU, by centralizing monetary policy yet leaving national-level wage-bargaining systems (and fiscal policy) intact. What follows will discuss how complementarities between macro and micro-level elements of the institutional frameworks operated.
These arguments are inspired by a debate on the links between labour market institutions and economic performance that emerged in the 1980s. One position in that debate, which is of crucial importance for understanding the effects of EMU, is related to the model developed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) . The basic intuition of that model is that semi-centralized systems of collective bargaining will perform less well than either highly decentralized and highly centralized wage-setting frameworks, since in the semi-centralized ones, each individual union is strong enough to be able to bargain above-productivity wage increases, but small enough not to have to bear the full cost in terms of inflation or unemployment of that decision. In contrast, in both highly centralized and decentralized wage-setting systems -strong trade unions in the first, individual employees or company-level bargainers in the second -are forced to take into account these consequences, and thus set wages at a sustainable level in terms of inflation and unemployment.
The introduction of an independent conservative central bank into this model reinforces this logic without altering it (Soskice and Iversen 2001; Hall and Franzese 1998) . In effect EMU moved, in terms of these models, wage-setting systems from highly coordinated national systems to an EMUwide medium-coordination arrangement: in every country the unions are strong enough to extract high wage increases but small enough to have only a limited effect on the EMU-wide inflation rate and therefore on the European Central Bank"s reaction function. Even Germany, easily the largest economy in Europe, only accounts for one-third of the overall inflation rate.
What do these developments imply in terms of capitalist diversity in Europe? Let us start with the Maastricht Treaty. Qualifying for EMU meant that prospective member-states met several economic criteria which had to do with the monetary stability of their economy. Exchange, interest and inflation rates were supposed to converge to a stable level, while public debt had to fall to a sustainable level. In principle these criteria were relatively easy to meet: central banks have the power to impose currency stability unilaterally and governments can do the same with austerity plans. But such drastic strategies are likely to have dramatic social consequences, and therefore negative electoral effects for the austerity-minded governments. Governments in the EU therefore adopted a strategy of bringing social partners around the table and negotiate social pacts with them that allowed them to meet the Maastricht criteria (Hassel 2006 ).
However, social pacts were not concluded everywhere (Hancké and Rhodes 2005) . It turns out that two conditions have to be met for social pacts to emerge. The first is, quite simply, that the country must actually have a problem meeting the Maastricht criteria -inflation and public debt has to be sufficiently above the target rate for governments and others to recognize this as an issue that might create problems for EMU accession. Secondly, social partners have to be able to credibly commit to social pacts -and often this means that companies and labour relations have to be organized in such a way that they support, from the bottom up as it were, the macro-strategy associated with social pacts. And this is where EMU and VoC meet. Most CMEs in Europe did not face problems meeting the Maastricht criteria, largely because they had become members of the Deutschmark bloc -a sort of proto-EMU -in the 1980s, and had reorganized their domestic institutions to guarantee exchange rate stability through low inflation.
In the other economies, where problems were visible and important, credible commitments were considerably more likely to emerge in economies which were organized around stable microfoundations, or, perhaps better, where a set of prior conditions supported the construction of interfirm coordination in such areas as training and wage-setting (Hancké and Rhodes 2005) . Social pacts are therefore, somewhat counter-intuitively, not found in most CMEs, but in those prospective EMU member-states that were able to rearrange their institutional make-up to support "macropacting". Culpepper (2002) argues that the prior networks encouraged information flows and deliberation, which allowed the views of the relevant parties to converge. The various forms of capitalism found in Europe thus played a role in how countries experienced and handled the pressures associated with the Maastricht Treaty and EMU.
Capitalist variety continued to be important after the introduction of the Euro as well. Many observers (e.g. Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen and Soskice 1998) , building on the Calmfors-Driffill model referred to earlier, predicted a surge in inflation, led by reinvigorated labour unions that were no longer subject to the hard constraints imposed by their national central bank. During the first ten years of EMU, however, wage inflation has been relatively subdued in the Euro-zone: the aggregate year-on-year inflation rate jumped slightly from a very low 1.1% at the start of EMU, but with very few exceptions, has oscillated between 1.5% and 3% since 2000. But this relative price stability hides quite dramatic variation across the different member-states (Johnston and Hancké 2009 ). In 1999, at the start of EMU, inflation (imposed by the Maastricht Treaty) ranged from slightly less than 1% in Germany and France to a little below 2.5% in Portugal and Spain. In 2001, inflation rates varied between almost 5% in Ireland, more than 4 % in Portugal and the Netherlands, and less than 2% in Germany and France. By 2004, the range was below 0.5% (Finland) and 4% (Ireland).
The explanation for this variation appears to be related to the type of wage bargaining system prevailing in each of these economies. Broadly speaking, those countries that have a tightly coordinated wage bargaining system, in which strong unions in the tradable goods (export) sector lead wage-setting and other trade unions follow, have lower inflation rates in EMU than countries with weaker forms of wage coordination or where it is altogether absent. Since high domestic inflation translates into uncompetitive export prices, labour unions which are exposed to competition have to take domestic price movements into account. They therefore keep their own wages in check, and transmit those moderate wages to the other labour unions and thus onto the economy as a whole through coordinated wage bargaining. In economies which lack such a mechanism, labour unions in the sheltered sectors (especially though not solely the public sector) can claim higher wage increases without having to take the inflationary effects into account. Put differently, CMEs are, on the whole, low-inflation economies in EMU, while the continental economies that are organized along different, more hybrid, combinations of market, state and associational lines have, on average, higher inflation rates (Johnston and Hancké 2009 ).
The second important point in that debate deals with the effects of this shift on the supplyside of the economy (Streeck 1992; Soskice 1999) . It deals with the micro-economic effects of macro-economic regimes, particularly when filtered through institutional frameworks. The key idea is that, under a fixed exchange rate regime -which is de facto what the Maastricht Treaty introduced for those countries that intended to join EMU from the start -a shift in wage-setting toward more wage coordination across sectors forces companies to become more competitive, not by lowering wages but by relocating themselves in higher value-added product market niches.
Wage-setting acts, in other words, under such restrictive macro-economic regimes, as a productivity whip by forcing underperforming firms "up" or "out". During the 1990s, when the Maastricht regime imposed a set of hard macro-economic constraints, firms indeed adapted and upgraded their product line to reflect strong wage pressures in countries where wages were set in a centrally coordinated system, while decentrally organized economies adjusted by adopting a more cost-sensitive product market strategy. Between 1992 and 2001, the simple correlation between wage bargaining system and product market strategy jumped dramatically from -0.4 to +0.3 (Hancké and Hermann 2007: 130) . Most of these adjustments reflected, in the case of upgrading, shifts in company organization that we usually associate with how workplaces are organized in CMEs (Hancké and Hermann 2007: 131-36).
The different organizational logics of capitalism in Western Europe prior to 1990 are therefore very useful tools to understand the adjustment of national economies to the macroeconomic regime that EMU heralded. On the whole, CMEs were better prepared to enter EMU, and have lower inflation rates in EMU. Furthermore, EMU seems to have invited many countries to increase central coordination in wage-setting as a way of bringing inflation under control, which forced companies to move into higher-value added market segments. And the outcome has been, at least until the financial and economic crisis of 2008-10, that different capitalist varieties persisted and flourished in Europe.
Eastward enlargement
The third political-economic shift in Europe over the last two decades has, of course, been the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent transition to a capitalist democracy in large parts of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). By 2004, eight of the countries that went through a peaceful revolution in 1989 (and in 1991 in the case of the Baltic states) joined the EU, and by 2009, several of them were full members of EMU. How can a perspective inspired by VoC enlighten our understanding of these processes? Answering that question is easier when we split the period in one which covers late communism and the immediate transition and a second which takes a bird"s-eye look back at the different patterns of economic organization in CEE.
The central problem that countries in CEE faced in 1990, relatively simple in principle but complicated in practice, was how to turn a state-led command economy into a privately-owned market economy. One group of authors proposed a shock therapy: the rapid and simultaneous introduction of the central institutions of capitalism is a necessary condition for a successful transition from a planned to a market economy. The information and incentives underlying a planned economy are so different from a market economy that hybrid systems are unlikely to function well, and may actually lead to perverse outcomes since the discipline of a market economy is dulled by non-market elements -"you cannot jump over a chasm in two steps", thus the key legitimating idea. Freely moving prices will quickly tell producers where to concentrate their activities, will guide the allocation of resources in the economy, and will allow consumers to balance free choice with a hard budget constraint. Relying on the price mechanism, however, is only possible if prices are stable, and a transition therefore entails a macro-economic stabilization programme as well, led by tough central banks and finance ministries who can contain spending and thus stabilize inflation as well as exchange rates.
By the end of the 1990s, this orthodox interpretation was coming under fire. Stiglitz"s (1999) analysis of transition, which criticized the wholesale destruction of existing pre-transition institutions and the problematic timing of different stages in the transition, was among the first systematic counter-arguments to emerge. Trust, so the argument goes, is a necessary ingredient of a market economy; however, since this trust is embedded in non-economic networks, the destruction of these networks ultimately undermines the capacity to choose different paths for the economy.
Left to its own devices, the economy thus adopted a purely market-based form of coordination -but this was not an evolution that necessarily imposed itself. In a comparison of Estonia and Slovenia, Feldman (2007) took this critique one analytical step further: the difference between the CME Slovenia and the LME Estonia is related to the network-promoting versus the network-disrupting government policies adopted during the transition in the two countries. Combining these points and translating them into the language of VoC, these critiques of the orthodox political-economic positions suggest that by resolutely turning toward a minimal institutional and social embeddedness of the newly emerging market economy, the transitions in fact precluded alternative, institutionally "thicker" forms of capitalism from emerging. If Central Europe is "liberal", it is so by design rather than by default: business coordinating capacity, a necessary ingredient for the types of capitalism associated with the northern half of the continent (and Scandinavia), was simply unable to emerge.
The actual evolution of CEE may, however, be less dramatic than this suggests. After the initial transition, the region has become a major destination of foreign direct investment (FDI). It is not hard to guess why multinational companies located production sites in Central Europe: the region offered a relatively skilled workforce that worked for a fraction of the normal wage in the rich north-west European countries. Unsurprisingly, given the large relative wage differentials and geographic proximity, much of the FDI into the region was German in origin. But after a few years, a slightly more differentiated picture emerged. A careful comparison of investment in and export profiles of different CEE member-states, based on the asset-specificity typology that Greskovits (2005) has constructed, suggests quite convincingly that broadly speaking two very different production profiles have emerged there over the last 10-15 years. This typology is based on the degree to which industries are labour or capital-intensive, and, dichotomising the positions for both factors of production, leads to four types.
The first is intensive only in physical capital: a "heavy-basic" profile, which can be found in such sectors as food, live animals, beverages and tobacco, fuels, vegetable oils, iron and steel, pulp and paper, non-ferrous metals. The second profile has important contributions from both physical and human capital ("heavy-complex"), found in industries such as chemicals, machinery and equipment, road vehicles and transport equipment. The third relies almost entirely only on human capital ("light complex"), in such sectors as pharmaceuticals, office and data processing machines, electrical machinery, scientific equipment, optical goods and clocks. And the fourth is based on neither physical nor human capital, but unskilled labour ("light-basic"): typical sectors here are cork and wood, textile, rubber, furniture manufacturing, clothing and accessories and footwear. Input factors such as skills and suppliers will differ across these different types: a country dominated by light or heavy complex industries will require a workforce with more sophisticated training and suppliers that are more technologically advanced than a country which specializes in light-basic industries.
Using this typology as a lens to look at reindustrialization and investment in Central Europe shows a remarkable differentiation across the region. Slovenia and the Visegrád 4 (V4: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have increasingly specialized in heavy-complex and light-complex export industries, while in the others (the Baltics and south-eastern Europe) heavybasic and light-basic profiles dominate. In the V4 and Slovenia at least 40% of exports -and usually considerably more, up to 70% -over the last ten years consisted of complex goods; this figure of 40% appears to be the ceiling for the other CEE countries. In addition, the trajectories of the V4 and Slovenia contrast sharply with the Baltics and south-eastern Europe (SEE). In the first group, the share of complex products in exports rises almost immediately after the transition recession of the early 1990s, while that share first fell in the other group and began to rise only toward the end of the decade, and then only slowly. While it may be too early to treat these different outcomes as stable, there are reasons to believe that it is very difficult for the Baltics and SEE to catch up with the V4 in terms of the importance of complex manufacturing. The initial wave of investment in CEE seems to have produced network externalities which imply that complex manufacturing in future is likely to invest where other companies with a similar profile are located.
Again, rather than a single capitalist logic, different types seem to be emerging, each with their own coherent internal organization, leading to different specializations and economic performance. Yet, comparative advantage, reflected in the leading sectors, tends to be selfreinforcing over time. Tellingly, for example, the region between Prague, Katowice, Budapest and Vienna, has become the main hub of car assembly in the world, producing models in practically any segment, from relatively low value-added car models to sophisticated sport utility vehicles, while the Baltics are known world-wide for sophisticated software development and internet applications. This pattern of specialization in different sectors is slowly working its way into the system: as more specific skills are required in the V4, for example, companies discover the need for inter-firm coordination as a way of overcoming collective action problems that block the development of training systems (Hancké and Kurekova 2008) . And that, in turn, requires governance forms beyond firms, in which such quasi-voluntary institutions as Chambers of commerce seem to play a central role. But such a coordinated system, if it is developed, is likely to be a "Balkanized" version of coordination, which produces exclusive ("members-only") club goods. If that is the case -and it is, on current form, a likely outcome --the broader social effect will be a sharp segregation between those inside and those outside the networks, in a different labour market segment in the same region, or excluded from this beneficial regional development model altogether.
Conclusion
Thinking about European capitalism not as one, but as a collection of different types, turns out to be a very useful perspective on change and adjustment in European economies over the last three decades. It helps us make sense of many of the adjustment paths following the oil shocks of the 1970s, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the completion of the Single Market Programme in the early 1990s, and EMU and eastern enlargement in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Such a perspective alerts us to several developments that other approaches might miss (see also Hall 2007) .
Adjustment often follows an institutional logic of change: similar shocks can be translated into very different outcomes; comparative advantage in an integrating single market reinforces that logic of adjustment; and institutional complementarities impose sometimes narrow paths of adjustment. Put differently, after two decades of almost permanent adjustment and change, it is still quite simple to recognize countries such as Germany, France, and the small corporatist economies in the northWest of Europe as both very similar to their older versions and very different from the UK. And even in Central Europe, where alternatives appeared limited, different models of capitalist organization emerged, often on the back of foreign investment. Capitalist diversity is, it seems, here to stay, despite all the pressures for convergence that emanate from European economic integration, financial and economic globalization, and eastward enlargement.
But such a perspective is not a panacea. It does not capture all moments of change that Europe is or might be going through. Welfare states everywhere are facing problems, both of funding and of organization, and the reforms that have taken place in many continental European countries as often as not reflect similar pressures and inter-governmental learning and policy transfers. Some of the changes might simply be too small to notice today but can have large consequences a few decades down the road, and, of course, the financial crisis which started in 2007 and which engulfed the entire world by the time this book is published may have shifted the basic parameters of economic policy-making to such an extent that advanced capitalist economies over the entire world are forced to reinvent themselves. Some might even argue that the crisis, against the background of the pressures for adjustment in the welfare state and in global competition, will succeed where the assault of orthodox economics on the coordinated market economies failed over the last two decades -albeit, somewhat ironically, in the opposite direction of a more regulated, less "turbo" capitalism. They might be right; but if the past is any guide, that is an unlikely outcome. Ten years from now, the various models of capitalism in Europe are likely to be recognizably different, and the way we started to think about those differences in the early 2000s is likely to be a very good guide to understanding why. .
